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  Imagine this (nightmare) scenario: In the November 2020 election, 
one party wins control of both Houses of Congress, and the presidency comes 
down to a disputed election in a state that typically leans toward the other party. 
Let’s say that Republicans take back a majority of the House of Representatives, 
retain control of the Senate, and the presidency will depend on a swing state like 
Pennsylvania—a state that voted for the Democratic nominee from 1992 
through 2012 but the Republican nominee in 2016. Assume also that Congress, 
now fully under Republican control, receives two competing slates of electoral 
college votes from Pennsylvania stemming from ballot counting disputes: one 
slate for Donald Trump and the other for Joe Biden. Or perhaps Congress 
receives only one slate of electoral college votes, in favor of Biden, but Trump 
and other Republicans claim that voter fraud make the totals from Pennsylvania 
inaccurate. On January 6, 2021, Congress will count the electoral college votes 
and announce the winner of the presidency. During a dispute, can Congress 
refuse to count any electoral college votes from a particular state that is 
embroiled in controversy? Could Congress simply ignore Pennsylvania’s 
submission in this scenario?  
The short answer is that although Congress has the statutory authority to 
disregard a state’s electoral votes entirely, that option should generally be off 
the table.  
In the unfortunate situation that a disputed presidential election ends up in 
Congress, the two Houses could theoretically refuse to count any electoral 
college votes from a particular state under the federal Electoral Count Act 
(ECA), which provides rules for Congress to follow when resolving a disputed 
presidential election. To be sure, the ECA already includes a presumption that 
Congress must count electoral college votes unless both Houses agree not to 
count them. But there are no standards to guide Congress’s decision, meaning 
that both Houses could reject a state’s submission based on pure partisanship. 
In addition, the ambiguous language of the statute leaves open the possibility 
that Congress could fail to credit a state’s electoral college votes even if only 
one House rejects them.  
Instead, the presumption, though not absolute, should be almost 
impenetrable: absent evidence of bribery or the like, and unless there is strong 
bipartisan agreement in both Houses, Congress should count votes from all fifty 
states (and D.C.), even if one or more states are disputed. This short essay 
explains why a refusal to count electoral college votes—absent a bipartisan 
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agreement that actual evidence proves bribery or something similar—would be 
wrong as a matter of democratic principle and would violate core constitutional 
norms. 
THE PROBLEMATIC 1887 STATUTE THAT CONGRESS WOULD USE TO 
RESOLVE A DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
 Congress has seemingly given itself the option not to count a state’s 
electoral college votes in several situations. The Electoral Count Act, which 
Congress passed in the wake of the Hayes-Tilden presidential election dispute 
of 1876, has several (confusing) provisions that are relevant to the question of 
whether Congress can simply refuse to count the electoral college votes from a 
state. 
First, the statute provides,  
No electoral vote or votes from any State which shall have been 
regularly given by electors whose appointment has been lawfully 
certified to according to section 6 of this title from which but one return 
has been received shall be rejected, but the two Houses concurrently 
may reject the vote or votes when they agree that such vote or votes 
have not been so regularly given by electors whose appointment has 
been so certified. (emphasis added) 
The ECA therefore includes a presumption to count a state’s submission of 
its electoral college votes—unless both Houses agree not to count them. That is, 
once a state submits a single slate of electoral college votes for a particular 
candidate, Congress must count those votes unless both Houses “agree that such 
vote or votes have not been so regularly given.” Yet, problematically, there are 
no standards to determine if the votes of a state “have not been so regularly 
given,” providing Congress with immense discretion. Congressmember George 
E. Adams remarked, in the congressional debate over the bill in December 1886, 
that “by the insertion of the words ‘regularly given,’ everything is thrown into 
as much confusion as if this conclusive presumption [to count a state’s 
submission] had not been established.” Indeed, there seems to be nothing in the 
language that would prevent the two Houses from rejecting a state’s electoral 
college votes based purely on partisan motivation. This reality is why the 
hypothetical above starts with Republicans controlling both Houses of 
Congress: presumably they could act solely with politics in mind to reject a 
state’s electoral college votes for Joe Biden if that state would give Biden the 
presidency. Of course, we could just as easily reverse the partisan make-up of 
Congress in the hypothetical, or have the Houses split on partisan control, and 
have the same problem. 
 Second, the Electoral Count Act provides that if a state submits two 
competing sets of electoral college votes, perhaps because of a vote counting 
dispute in the state, Congress must count the votes that comply with the so-
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called Safe Harbor provision (Section 5 of the Act). The Safe Harbor provision 
says that Congress will count a state’s votes so long as the state has a dispute 
resolution process set out before Election Day, follows that process, and 
resolves the dispute within at least six days before the electors are to meet. But 
if there is a dispute as to which of two submitted returns actually receives Safe 
Harbor status, then Congress may count only those votes that the two Houses 
“concurrently decide is supported by the decision of such State so authorized by 
its law.” That is, both Houses must agree as to which electoral college 
submission to count in this situation. Presumably, if they cannot agree, then 
Congress cannot count either slate, meaning the state goes unrepresented in the 
final electoral college count. Alternatively, the following sentence of the statute 
(discussed next) might apply, which says that Congress should count the return 
signed by the Governor.  
 Finally, if there are multiple submissions of electoral college votes from a 
state, and neither claim Safe Harbor status (perhaps because both were finalized 
after the statutory deadline), then the Electoral Count Act says that Congress 
should count the ones “which the two Houses shall concurrently decide were 
cast by lawful electors appointed in accordance with the laws of the State, unless 
the two Houses, acting separately, shall concurrently decide such votes not to 
be the lawful votes of the legally appointed electors of such State.” Essentially, 
both Houses must either agree or not agree to count a particular electoral college 
submission. Yet the very next sentence adds a wrinkle to the prior statement that 
both Houses must agree to count a submission, providing essentially a 
tiebreaker: “But if the two Houses shall disagree in respect of the counting of 
such votes, then, and in that case, the votes of the electors whose appointment 
shall have been certified by the executive of the State, under the seal thereof, 
shall be counted.” This sentence suggests that, in a situation where the Houses 
disagree, Congress should count the votes submitted by a state’s Governor (the 
“executive of the State”). So, which is it? Can Congress count a particular 
submission of electoral college votes only if both Houses agree, and otherwise 
it cannot count any votes from that state, or must it count the votes that the 
Governor has certified? Scholars have disagreed on the proper interpretation of 
the statute, because, as Professor Ned Foley notes, “the fact is that the text is not 
sufficiently clear to rule out the possibility of alternative interpretations.” 
 Here is the bottom line: the statute Congress would invoke to resolve a 
dispute regarding a state’s electoral college submission includes enough 
ambiguity to allow Congress not to count any electoral college votes from that 
state. 
 But refusing to count any votes from a state is problematic for two main 
reasons, one based on democratic theory and the other based on constitutional 
law principles, though both come from the same place: failing to count any 
submission from a state, after the state has run a presidential election, would 
unfairly disenfranchise thousands, if not millions, of voters.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
 The right to vote is not merely a nice phrase or an abstract concept: it is 
the very foundation of our democracy. Refusing to count the electoral college 
votes from a state, after the state has administered a presidential election, is 
tantamount to taking away the right to vote for the nation’s highest office.  
 The U.S. Constitution does not directly confer an individual right to vote. 
In fact, it says that state legislators may determine how to award their electoral 
college votes. Early in the country’s history, many states simply appointed their 
electors for whichever candidate the state legislature chose. But as the Supreme 
Court pointed out in Bush v. Gore, “[h]istory has now favored the voter, and in 
each of the several States the citizens themselves vote for Presidential electors.” 
Moreover, the Court held that when a state grants the right to vote for president, 
“the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source 
of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the 
equal dignity owed to each voter.” As the Court explained in its case involving 
so-called faithless electors in July 2020, the Constitution can provide “checks” 
on a state’s ability to appoint its electors: “A State, for example, cannot select 
its electors in a way that violates the Equal Protection Clause.” That is, although 
the Constitution gives states the authority to determine their electors, 
presidential elections still implicate the constitutional right to vote.1 
 The Constitution therefore implies a fundamental right to individuals to 
vote for president, once a state decides to award its electoral college votes 
through a statewide popular election. Congress’s refusal to count a state’s 
electoral college votes during a disputed election would violate this core 
principle, effectively disenfranchising all voters in the state. Although 
Congress’s decision in this context would certainly implicate the political 
question doctrine, suggesting that the Supreme Court would not want to resolve 
the controversy, the action would still raise questions surrounding equal 
protection, substantive due process, and the foundational nature of the right to 
vote for democratic legitimacy.  
 Americans would also likely refuse to accept a result that disenfranchises 
an entire state. In a slightly different context, during the 2008 primary season 
the Democratic Party initially refused to seat delegates from Florida and 
Michigan at its National Convention because those states had broken party rules 
by scheduling their primaries earlier than the party wanted. Florida Republican 
Governor Charlie Crist (now a Democrat in Congress) and Michigan 
Democratic Governor Jennifer Granholm said that the party was “silencing ‘the 
voices of 5,163,271 Americans’ who voted in their primaries.” Their votes 
would count for nothing. Amidst this uproar, and after it would no longer make 
a difference in deciding the nominee, the party eventually agreed to count half 
of the delegates from these states and then ultimately seated the delegates with 
full voting power. This episode demonstrates that Americans would likely balk 
at Congress’s decision not to credit any votes from a state. 
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A failure to count electoral college votes also would implicate the “equal 
dignity of the states” idea that the Supreme Court recognized in Shelby County 
v. Holder when it invalidated an important provision of the Voting Rights Act. 
The Court stated that “the constitutional equality of the States is essential to the 
harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.” 
Regardless of whether the Court properly invoked this principle in Shelby 
County, wholly failing to count the electoral college votes from a state would 
likely violate this equal sovereignty ideal, absent a particularly compelling 
justification. Again, the Supreme Court is unlikely to involve itself in a question 
that is up to Congress to decide, but the lack of a judicial remedy does not make 
the constitutional infirmities any less concerning.  
But what if there is evidence that the electoral college votes a state submits 
are truly fraudulent? What if both houses of Congress find, for instance, that 
those electoral college votes are a result of bribery, or in the words of 
Congressmember Adams from 1886, a “rank forgery”? Must Congress still 
count votes from that state?  
In a word, no, but this is a very narrow exception to the strong presumption 
that Congress should count votes from all states absent truly extraordinary 
circumstances. The default should be that Congress cannot refuse to credit a 
state’s submission unless there is overwhelming bicameral and bipartisan 
agreement to do so. This is the only context in which, in the first portion of the 
statute mentioned above, Congress might find that the votes were not “regularly 
given.” In this circumstance, the validity of the democratic process itself could 
counterbalance the individual constitutional right to vote, as a submission based 
on bribery would truly impinge the will of the people. It would be best if 
Congress limited its own authority by codifying a rule that it must count 
electoral college votes from every state unless a supermajority of legislators 
from both parties in both chambers agree that there is fraud or another similar 
reason to ignore a state’s submission. In addition, as the Electoral Count Act 
seems to contemplate already, if only one House objects and the other House 
wants to accept the votes, then again the default rule must be to count those 
votes.  
But what if a state sends in competing slates of electors? Why is choosing 
one or the other better than counting none of them, if the winner of that state is 
truly unknowable? The answer once again comes down to democratic 
legitimacy, the fundamental nature of the right to vote, and the equality of the 
states. In the situation of competing slates of electors with no real evidence of 
bribery, refusing to count any votes for a state disenfranchises all of the state’s 
voters. Counting one of the slates of electors at least gives a voice to roughly 
half of the voters who chose that candidate. That is true even when that final 
state would determine the national winner. Democracy, which requires the 
“consent of the governed,” should credit voters whenever possible. In any 
disputed election with competing slates of electors, each candidate likely 
received roughly half of the vote, meaning that the election is essentially a toss-
up. In that situation, roughly half is better than none, and not counting the state 
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at all should be off the table. After all, in other states where a candidate 
indisputably received more votes than any other candidate, our winner-take-all 
system allows a plurality of the electorate to enjoy full representation in the 
electoral college (though Maine and Nebraska split their electoral college votes 
based on who won each congressional district). With no ability for a re-vote, the 
entire state should not suffer full disenfranchisement just because the election 
in that state is disputed. Thus, although there is no great solution in this situation, 
counting one of the slates is the better of two poor options. Of course, the 
decision of which slate to count will be inherently political. But so would the 
refusal to count any votes from the state. Better to allow the voices of about half 
of the voters to be heard in the selection of the president. In this situation, 
Congress should do its best to determine the will of the voters in that state, 
perhaps through a truly bipartisan commission that can consider the dispute.  
We therefore land on an almost-categorical rule, or at least an extremely 
strong presumption: Congress must count electoral college votes from every 
state unless there is a strong bipartisan agreement from both Houses that bribery 
or something similar tainted that submission. 
CONCLUSION 
 The confusing nature of the Electoral Count Act underscores an important 
point: perhaps the electoral college itself has outlived its usefulness and a 
popular vote plan would be better. But it is the system we have for 2020 and the 
foreseeable future, so we must work within its confines. That reality includes 
guiding Congress on how it should resolve a disputed election. 
 Since the Hays-Tilden dispute of 1876 and the passage of the Electoral 
Count Act, Congress has never refused to count electoral college votes from a 
state. For example, in 1961, Congress faced competing slates of electors 
submitted by Hawaii and ultimately determined which one to count, yet the 
decision did not affect the final outcome. The statutory language supports a 
general notion that Congress will usually count all electoral college votes.  
But the statutory language—both explicit and through interpretation—also 
leaves the door open for Congress to disregard a state’s electoral college votes 
entirely. There is nothing to prevent a wayward, partisan-motivated Congress 
from using the Act to exclude a state’s submission. The language of the statute 
is so obtuse that it would be easy for Congress to find legal support for that 
action. There is also precedent not to credit a state’s electoral college votes: 
before the Electoral Count Act, Congress did not count electoral college votes 
from Arkansas and Louisiana in 1872 due to civil unrest in those states; 
excluding those states had no bearing on President Grant’s re-election that year.  
Therefore, Congress should conclude that, unless there is bipartisan and 
bicameral agreement that something extraordinary like bribery occurred, it will 
count electoral college votes from every state. Rejecting a state’s submission 
would represent the worst-case scenario: it would disenfranchise voters, treat 
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states unequally, and undermine the foundational concept of the right to vote to 
democratic legitimacy. Ultimately, Congress must count the votes. 
 
*  Thomas P. Lewis Professor of Law, University of Kentucky J. David 
Rosenberg College of Law. Thanks to Ned Foley, Michael Morley, Derek Muller, and 
Franita Tolson for comments on this essay. Thanks also to the Ohio State Moritz College 
of Law for hosting an invaluable symposium on the potential of a disputed presidential 
election.  
1 Under the U.S. Constitution, states could theoretically take back the right to vote for 
president and simply award their electors to whoever the state legislature wanted, as 
occurred in many states at the Founding. Yet, given our modern understanding of the 
constitutional right to vote, as the Supreme Court has recognized through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, that action would raise similar disenfranchisement 
concerns—especially if it occurred after the state’s citizens had already voted. Indeed, it is 
not clear whether the Court would sanction a state’s elimination of a popular election for 
president given the Court’s understanding of the right to vote under the Equal Protection 
Clause. This Essay focuses on a situation where a state has its citizens vote for president 
but Congress still decides not to count the electoral votes from that state. 
